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2003-2004 TCI: Dutch Parliamentary Inquiry Committee Infrastructure
Projects, chaired by Adri Duivesteijn
Betuwe Line (Rotterdam-Rhein Ruhr Area)
High Speed Line South (Amsterdam-Belgium)
Research support by seven TPM-experts:
Hugo Priemus, Bert van Wee, Hans de Bruijn, Ernst ten Heuvelhof, Joop 
Koppenjan, Martin de Jong, Martijn Leijten
Hugo Priemus, Bent Flyvbjerg, Bert van Wee (eds.), 2008,
‘Decision-making on Mega-Projects: Cost-Benefit Analysis, Planning and 
Innovation’, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham/Northampton
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High Speed Line South (Amsterdam-Belgium)
Transport services (15 years);
Infraprovider (DBFM: 25 years);
Substructure (D&C in 7 parts).
North-South Metro Line (Amsterdam
16 contracts infrastructure.
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Transport services HSL-South
1999-2001: concession for 15 year for both interior and international 
transport.
Four candidates:
1.  Arriva Netherlands and Deutsche Bahn (Germany)
2.  Connexxion (NL), CGEA-Connex (France) and SJ International (Sweden)
3.  NS Reizigers and KLM (later: High Speed Alliance: now HI Speed)
4. Stagecoach Holdings Plc (Great Britain)
Contract €148.4 million per year for the State.
Awarded to High Speed Alliance (HISpeed: 90% NS; 10% KLM).
After completion of HSL: two years delay because ERTMS safety system was 
not operational (no fall back option).
Recently operation has started: contract obligation may be too high. Risks
for NS finally covered by the State.
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Infraprovider HSL-South
1999-2001: Design; Construct; Finance & Maintain
contract for 25 years awarded to Infraspeed Consortium 
(BAM – NBM – Fluor Daniel – Siemens – Charterhouse –
Innisfree).
There were four serious competing consortia: infraspeed, 
Speed Rail, Zuid Rail Groep and Fastrail
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Infraprovider HSL-South(2)
Stages:
Selection of candidates (pre-qualification).
Invitation to Consult (4).
Invitation to Tender (3).
Invitation to Modify Bids (3).
Invitation to Negotiate (2).
Best and Final Offer.
Contract: November 2001: €1.108 million.
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Substructure HSL-South (1)
1 Mega-project? 21 Parts? Finally: 7 parts.
2001-2002 Parliamentary Committee on the Building 
Trade: revealed massive construction fraud and cartel
forming.
The HSL substructure contracts were part of this.
Competition was fake. Bids were 40% higher than
calculated budgets of Transport Ministry.
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Substructure HSL-South (2)
OTB Research Institute for Housing, Urban and Mobility Studies
10
Substructure HSL-South (3)
Design & Construct Strategy
Contracts were conservative and followed a defined
illustrative set of traditional specifications.
Scope optimization:
In spatial sense (track/nodes/area).
In temporal sense (1-30 years).
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Substructure HSL-South (4)
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North-South Metro Line (1)
16 contracts
2002: go-decision: 1.5 billion euro
2009: estimation (95% certainty): 3.1 billion euro
First round: Engineering & Construct (E&C)
Second round: Back to traditional RAW-specifications
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North-South Metro Line (2)
OTB Research Institute for Housing, Urban and Mobility Studies
14
North-South Metro Line (3)
First round of contracts (1)
Three deep stations:
Rokin
Vijzelgracht
Ceintuurbaan
drilling tunnels.
Six contractors invited (closed procedure).
E&C: aim = stimulate innovation.
Results: dissatisfactory
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North-South Metro Line (4)
First round of contracts (2)
November 2000: invitation to tender: price without risks + 
catalogue of risks with a price per risk.
Risk fund + bonus scheme for contractors.
Bids: 1,5 – 2 times higher than budget municipality.
Only contracting drilling tunnels successful: awarded to 
Saturn.
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North-South Metro Line (5)
First round of contracts (3)
Lloyds & Horvat: budget municipality 10%-30% too low.
Contract Saturn included Risk Assessment and Allocation
Catalogue (RAAC).
Concern for contractors: technological risks, common domain, 
environment, negative image of political decision-making in 
Amsterdam.
Lack of real competition.
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North-South Metro Line (6)
Second round of contracts (1)
Contracts from E&C to traditional RAW.
Bidding documents for the first time also in English: October 25, 2001
Three contracts successful: Zinktunnel IJ, Caissons Damrak and Rokin
Station.
Prices 20% and more too high: Vijzelgracht Station, Ceintuurbaan Station 
and Central Station.
One German contractor: Max Bögl, could not find Dutch subcontractors. No 
subcontractor price for earthwork, deep walls and jetgrouten.
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North-South Metro Line (7)
Second round of contracts (2)
Vijzelgracht station: difference budget-bid very high.
Contractor Heijmans-Holzmann collaborated with subcontractor Soletanche.
January 24, 2002: Email director Heijmans to Soletanche by accident 
received by Municipality.
Revealed earlier cartel agreement (ultimo 2000) between Heijmans and 
Soletanche to exclude others.
Holzmann: in financial trouble. Bid Heijmans-Holzmann declared invalid.
Dutch Competition Authority (NMa) declared Heijmans and Soletanche
guilty (December 18, 2001): € 50,000 penalty.
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North-South Metro Line (8)
Third round of contracts
Invitation to submit a reduced price.
Contracts awarded for Vijzelgracht Station and 
Ceintuurbaan Station to Max Bögl (was already
contracted for Rokin Station).
Bögl: price for three stations together.
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North-South Metro Line (9)
After the contracting rounds: renegotiation of contracts.
Parts of contracts shifted to common domain.
Drilling tunnels: risk factor = speed of the drilling engine: 12 meter 
per day. All risks for the Municipality. Risk funds introduced.
A large number of surprises occurred: increasing the costs for the 
Municipality. Many differences of interpretation of contract 
formulations. Fuzzy formulations.
Central Station: two mediators were hired about the length of the 
implementation:
Municipality: 387 weeks; contractor: 567 weeks;
agreement: 480 weeks. Result: higher costs for the Municipality.
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North-South Metro Line (10)
Technological problems (high press coverage):
- leakages in the building excavations;
- damage to a number of buildings close to the
metro track.
Construction activities were stopped.
Alderman Herringa stepped down.
Recommendation Veringa Committee: continue the 
works.
September 4, 2009: Start Inquiry Committee of 
Council Members, chaired by Maurice Limmen, to 
reconstruct what happened in the past and to learn
lessons.
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North-South Metro Line (11)
Conclusions (1)
1. Strategic importance of North-South Line undisputed.
2. Go-decision too early: Municipality was not in control.
3. Cartel forming and building fraud.
4. Foreign contractors largely excluded.
5. Technological and interface issues underestimated by
Municipality. Gap between budget and bid: 50-100%. 
Bridged by virtual measures.
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North-South Metro Line (12)
Conclusions (2)
6. Municipality is not in control at the moment.
Interactions between 16 contracts; contracts and 
environment.
15 Top risks need additional reservation of 500 
million euro.
North-South Line is ready in 2016 or 2019.
Costs: 3.1 billion euro (according to Veerman-
Committee); this was 1.5 billion euro at the start.
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North-South Metro Line (13)
Conclusions (3)
7. Municipality Board entrapped in micro-management. 
Dividing line public-private: blurred and changing.
8. Contracts about operation of N-S line and 
management of stations: still to be made.
9. Final evaluation: too early now.
Two years after start operation (about 2020): time for
final evaluation. Many lessons to be learnt.
10.Rethink public domain in preparing, constructing and 
operating large public transport infrastructure.
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Preliminary conclusions
1. Experience with innovative contracts (E&C; D&C; 
DBFM) in the Netherlands determined by a long 
tradition of cartel forming in building industry.
2. Do not underestimate the danger of cannibalism of 
new public transport infrastructure in relation to 
existing public transport networks.
3. Innovative contracts: exciting in theory, disappointing
in practice.
4. Deal flow of innovative contracts: too small. 
Transaction costs too high.
5. Go-decision: only to be taken when public authorities
are in control. Otherwise: cost overruns, time delays.
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Preliminary conclusions
6. Clear demarcation of public and private 
responsibilities before and after go-decision is 
essential. Responsibility public authority: clearly
defined and related to public values and public 
finance.
7. Make project flexible and resilient. Maintain
alternatives and options in each stage of decision-
making.
8. Innovative contracting in public transport 
infrastructure in the Netherlands is still in its infancy.
